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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEON SHAW, 
Plaintiff and Appellamt, 
vs. 
OREM CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion and VICTOR DURHAM, E. H. 
JOHNSON, A. A. RICHARDS, 
WOODRUFF JENSEN, and 
PHILO EDW ARD~s, Councilmen 
constituting the City Council of 
said corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
7376 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS-
TRICT COURT, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE WM. STANLEY DUNFORD 
McCULLOUGH, BOYCE & McCULLOUGH I L .E attorneys for Plaintiff mnd AppeUant 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEOX :-SHA\Y, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ORE"JI CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion and VICTOR DURHA!I, E. H. 
.JOHXSOK, A. A. RICHARDS, 
WOODRUFF JENSEN, and 
PHILO ED\YARDS, Councilmen 
ronstituting the City Council of 
~aid corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7376 
The facts in this case are found in the first four 
paragraphs of plaintiff's complaint, which were ad-
mitted in defendants' answer and in a stipulation made 
in open court between the parties, and are substantially 
as follows: 
That plaintiff is a resident of Utah County, State 
of Utah, doing business as a tavern operator in Orem 
City, Utah, which business is duly licensed as required 
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by law. That plaintiff's principal buBiness consists of 
the sale of draught and bottled beer to the general pub-
lic. That in connection with said business and incidental 
thereto plaintiff sells to the general ·public such items as 
candy, soft drinks, tobacco, cigarettes and cigars. (R. 
1, 2, 31, 32). 
That Orem City is a municipal corporation orga-
nized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of 
the State of Utah. That the defendants, Victor Durham, 
E. H. Johnson, A. A. Richards, Woodruff Jensen and 
Philo Edwards, constitute the duly elected, qualified and 
acting City Council of Orem City, Utah. (R. 1, 31, 32). 
That for many years prior to May 29, 1947, that 
is from approximately 1934 until May 29, 1947, the sale 
and offering for sale of beer in Orem City waB permitted 
and was lawful on Sunday. (R. 32, 43) That on or about 
June 25, 1'948, said city council, relying on Sec. 15-8-84, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, passed Orem City Ordinance 
No. 91, Section 1 of which reads as follows: 
"It shall be unlawful for any persons to 
engage in the business of the sale of light beer 
at retail in bottles or on draught within the cor-
porate lin1its of Orem City on the firBt day of the 
week commonly called Sunday.'' (R. 1, 5, 6) 
That said ordinance became effective July 1, 1948. That 
all other ordinances of Orem City relating to Sunday 
closing have been repealed by the city council of Orem 
City so that there is now no Orem City Sunday closing 
ordinance prohibiting or making unlawful the sale, or 
offering for sale, of any other item, service or commodity 
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en Sunday except beer. That said Ordinance No. 91 
prohibits the sale and offering for sale on Sunday of 
beer only. (R. 12, 32) 
That there are within the corporate limits of Orem 
City approximately ten licensed beer dealers all but 
two of which have draught beer licenses. That there 
are within the corporate limits of Orem City a great 
number of other businesses all of which may, and many 
of which do operate in the usual manner on Sunday. That 
included in such businesses are the following: Cleaning 
establishments, bank, automobile service stations, ga-
rages, auto parts store, implement store, clothing store.s, 
meat markets, grocery stores, drug store, pool hall, 
furniture stores, motion picture theatre, ice cream par-
lor, confectionary. That this list of business is represen-
tative bt1t not all inclusive of the businesses which exist 
within the corporate limits of Orem City and may or do 
operate on Sunday. (R. 33, 45) 
On September 3, 1948, plaintiff commenced the in-
stant action under Chapter 64, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, Title 104, known as the Declaratory Judgment 
Statute whereby plaintiff sought to have the ordinance 
in question declared unconstitutional and invalid as being 
in violation of the provisions of Article I, Sections 1, 
2, 7, 11, 2·2, 24, 25, 26 and 27 ano Article XI, Section 5 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and of Amend-
ment~ 5 and 14 of the Constitution of the United States 
of America. (R. 1, 3) The case was argued before the 
lower court on the stipulated statements of facts con-
tained in paragraphs 1 to 4 of plaintiff's complaint and as 
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stipulated in open court. No evidence for or on behalf 
of any of the parties was presented. On the 31st day of 
March, 1949, the lower court issued its memorandum de-
eision and on the 8th day of June, 1949, final judgment 
was entered against the plaintiff, in which judgment the 
lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of 
said Ordinance No. 91. From this judgment plaintiff 
appeals. ( R. 26-28, 35) 
STATE~1:ENT OF ERRORS 
1. The court erred in holding that the provisions 
of Section 15-8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, do auth-
orize or permit the enactment of the ordinance in ques-
tion and do grant to respondents authority to enact said 
0rdinance without being in violation of the provisions of 
Article I, Sections 1, 2, 7, 11, 22, 24, 25, 26 and 27, Article 
XI, Section 5 and Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah. 
2. The court erred in making its decision by reading 
into the decision evidence which was not presented to 
the court by either plaintiff or defendant and which 
wa.s not agreed to by either plaintiff or defendant, which 
evidence is as follows : 
(a) That the ordinance in question does tend to 
improve the morals; peace and good order of the com-
munity through its prohibition of the sale of beer on 
Sunday. (R. 33) 
(b) Reference to the unrestricted sale of 3.2 beer 
(R. 25) and to congested traffic on Sundays in Orem 
City. (R. 26) 
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;). That the court erred in holding- that Ordinance 
Ko. 91 is Yalid and constitutional and not violative of 
the provisions of Article I, Sections 1, 2, 7, 11, 22, 24, 
:25, 26, 27 and Article XI, Section 5 of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah and of Amendments V and XIY of 
the Constitution of the United States of America. 
ARGUMENT 
PROPOSITION I. THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SEC. 
15-8-84, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, DO NOT AUTHO-
RIZE OR PERMIT THE ENACTMENT OF THE ORDINANCE 
IN QUESTION, BUT IF IT WERE TO BE SO CONSTRUED 
AS TO GRANT TO RESPONDENTS AUTHORITY SO TO 
DO, SAID SECTION 15-8-84 'WOULD BE VIOLATIVE OF THE 
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 2, 7, 11, 22, 24, 
25, 26, 27, ARTICLE XI, SECTION 5 AND ARTICLE V SEC-
TION 1, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH. (Statement of Error No. 1) 
It is a well known general rule that "municipal cor-
porations ·possess and can exercise only such power-5 
as are expressly granted them, necessarily incident to 
the powers expressly conferred, or essential to the accom-
plishment of the declared objects and purposes of the 
corporation." (50 Am. Jur. Sundays and Holidays, Sec. 
8) Therefore, the municipal government must legislate 
reasonably with respect to the OBJECTS and PUR-
POSES to be accomplished otherwise such action will 
be constrtted to be beyond its power and autho.rity. 
Section 15-8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, grants 
the general power and authority to municipal corpora-
tions to: 
''. . . pass all ordinances and rules, and make 
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all regulations not repugnant to law, necessary 
for carrying into effect or discharging all powers 
and duties conferred by this chapter, and such as 
are necessary and proper to provide for the safety 
and preserve the health, and promote the pros-
perity, improve the morals, peace and good order, 
comfort and convenience of the city and the in-
habitants thereof, and for the protection of the 
property therein.'' 
It is appellant's contention that since the ordinance 
as framed does not extend to all vocations and to the 
sale of all merchandise except necessaries, it is not de-
signed to effect the purposes for which limited police 
powers are granted to municipalities. 
This court in the case of GRONLUND v. SALT 
I)AJ(E CITY, -U-; 194 P. 2d 464, at page 466, states as 
follows: "THE PURPOSE OF SUCH STATUTES IS 
TO PROTECT SOCIETY BY ESTBLISHING A COM-
PULSORY DAY OF REST." If such is the purpose 
(Jf the Sunday Closing law, what difference is there be-
tween an employee working in a tavern and an employee 
working in a grocery store, pool hall, automobile service 
station, garages, automobile parts store, implement store, 
furniture store, motion picture theatre, ice cream parlor, 
confectionary, etc., to mention but a few of the businesses 
that Pxist in Orem City. (R. 45) Certainly the labor of 
a tavern employee is no more arduous than the labor 
of some of the others. 
In STATE v. MASON, 94 Utah 501, at page 508, 
78 P. 2d 920, 923; 117 A.L.R. 330, this court stated: 
''In order to see whether the excluded classes or trans-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.-
1 
<1 Ction~ are on a different ba~i~ than those included, 
"·e must look to the purpose of the act. The objects and 
p11rposes of a laze prrsent the to11chstone fo.r determiwing 
proper and improper classifirations." As stated by this 
court in GROXLF~rn v. SALT LAKE CITY (cited 
supra), the object and purpose of Sunday Closing laws 
•' is to protect society by establishing a compulsory day 
of rest.'' The employee of a tavern is as much in need 
of that clay of rest as the employee in a grocery store, 
pool hall, etc. How is "it promotive of the health, safety, 
morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of 
the inhabitants of Orem City to prohibit the working of 
employees of taverns while permitting the employment 
of grocery store clerks, pool hall operators, icemen, 
movie theatre employees, etc1 This court specifically 
answered this question in GRONLUND v. SALT LAKE 
CITY -U-; 194 P. 2d 464, at page 467, when it stated: 
• '''lflether the purpose of the ordinance in 
qPestion be comformable to the original purpose 
of such acts, to protect religious observance of 
the f-;ahbath or that of the protection of Society 
by establishing a compulsory day of rest, it is not 
clear why the prohibition of the sale of commodi-
ties is in furtherance of such purpose or object 
and the prohibition of the various permitted com-
mercial activities is not. It is difficult to conceive 
why it is promotive of the health, safety, nwrals, 
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the 
inhabitants of Salt Lake City to prohibit in 
effect the working of a salesman or saleswoman 
on Sunday, while permitting employment of com-
mon laborers, artisans, stenographers and laun-
dresses. 
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"\Ve are not advised that the work of a seller 
of haberdashery is so much more arduous than 
that of a ditch digger as to require that the law 
protect the former and not the latter from the po.s-
sihility of being employed seven days a week. 
... As thus viewed and as gauged by the grant 
o:f municipal power hereinabove referred to, we 
find the prohibitions of the ordinance bear no 
reasonable relationship to the objectives to be ac-
complished hy enactment~ n1ade pursuant to such 
·grant. Of this ordinance, it can be said that,' there 
is no fa~ir reason for the ~aw that would not re-
quire 'with errual force its extension to others which 
it leares 'Untouched.' " 
The objectives and purposes to be accomplished 
by Sunday Closing laws as expressly laid down by this 
court is, ''to protect society by establishing a compul-
sory day of rest." (GRONLUND v. SALT LAKE 
CITY, cited supra). The employee of a tavern is in 
the same position as the employee of a grocery store, 
pool hall, ice cream parlor, ete., and "there is no fair 
re,ason for the law that would not require with equal 
force its extension to groce.ry clerks, pool hall operators, 
movie theatre employees, etc., which it le,aves un-
touched.'' 
PROPOSITION II. THAT THE LOWER COURT IN MAK-
ING ITS DECISION READ INTO THE DECISION EVI-
DENCE WHICH WAS NOT PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
BY EITHER. PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT AND WHICH 
WAS NOT AGREED TO BY EITHER PLAINTIFF OR DE-
FENDANT. (Statement of Error No. 2) 
The lower court in attempting to rationalize its 
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presented to the court by either plaintiff or defendant 
and which was not agreed to by either plaintiff or de-
fendant. (R. 2;), 26, 33) The lower court at page 33 of 
the record makes a finding of fact that the ordinance 
in question does tend to improve the morals, peace and 
good order of the con1n1unity through its prohibition 
of the sale of beer on Sunday. There is not one scin-
tilla of ev-idence that this is a fact. The lower court 
at page 25 of the record speaks of the ''unrestricted 
sale of 3.2 beer." There was no evidence produced and 
none could be produced to show that appellant, a tavern 
owner, is engaged in the "unrestricted s·ale of 3.2 beer" 
or for that matter, that there is "unrestricted sale of 
3.2 beer'' in the entire city of Orem. The assumptions 
by the lower court as to the results from the "unre-
stricted sale of 3.2 beer" are ficticious, without evi-
dentiary foundations and certainly not a matter of 
"common knowledge." On the contrary it is common 
knowledge that the sale of beer is rigidly governed by 
state law. (Liquor Control Act, Title 46, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943.) 
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record or 
otherwise to show that the burden of automobile traffic 
in the city of Orem is any greater on Sunday than on 
any other day of the week. (R. 25) Such reading of ' 
evidence into the record only demonstrates the lower 
court's attempt to justify a predetermined result, rather 
than base its decision on the evidence legally and law-
fully presented by the parties to the dispute. As a 
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matter of fact the automobile traffic in Orem City on 
Saturday night far exceeds that which is present on 
Sunday and yet the so-called ''unrestricted sale of 3.2 
beer" is not prohibited on Saturday night. Based on 
the lower courts reasoning the appellant should be able 
to read this into the record on appeal on the theory 
of the lower court's doctrine of "common knowledge." 
Appellant submits that such evidence is equally as 
ligitimate and admissible as that proposed by the lower 
court. 
PROPOSITION III. THAT SAID ORDINANCE IS IN-
y ALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLATIVE OF 
THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 2, 7, 11, 
22, 24, 25, 26, 27 AND ARTICLE XI, SECTION 5 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND OF 
AMENDMENTS V AND XIV OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Statement of Error 
No.3) 
Appellant further contends that the ordinance is 
unconstitutional for the reason that it is arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, and a denial of equal protection of the 
laws. 
The lower court placed great emphasis upon the 
fact that no person or agency could sell beer on Sunday 
in the city of Orem, therefore, there could be no unlawful 
discrimination between persons similarly situated, could 
not deprive persons of equal protection of the laws, 
and does not violate the provisions of uniformity of 
application. (R. 23) Appellant asserts that the lower 
courts reasoning is without foundation. The lower 
court stated (R. 22): "Through the licensing provi-
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sions as set forth, and through stores and package agen-
cies set up by the comn1ission under the statute, are, 
thus, the only two means by which beer may be law-
fully sold within this state. 
'• If, then, the agency of the state could sell beer 
on Sunday while the ordinance prohibited it within 
Orem, the ordinance would be discriminatory in that 
it did not uniformly affect per .sons similarly situated." 
The lower court then cites 46-0-86 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943 which provides: 
''X o sale or delivery of liquor shall be made 
on or frmn the premises of any state liquor store 
or package agency, nor shall any store or package 
agency be kept open for the sale of liq1.wr: (a) on 
any legal Holiday.'' 
Sundays are legal holidays under the provisions of 27-
0-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, therefore the lower 
court concluded that no person or agency could sell beer 
on Sunday in Orem City. 
Appellant contends that by the provisions of 46-0-45 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, the term "liquor" does not 
include "light beer" and, in fact, the statute expressly 
negatives the inclusion of the word "light beer" within 
the term liquor. And, by the provisions of 46-0-45, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, "light beer" is expressly defined 
as "beer containing not more than 3.2 per centum of 
alcohol by welight." Therefore, if we correct the reason-
ing of the lower court in accordance with the law, the 
Liquor Control Commission can sell beer on Sunday, 
hence there is discrimination between persons similarly 
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situated and the ordinance is void and unconstitutional. 
(BRDADBENT v. GIBS'ON, 105 Utah 53; 140 P. 2d 149; 
GRONLUND v. SALT LAKE CITY (supra, R. 22 and 
23) ). 
The ordinance i;~ further discriminatory between 
persons similarly situated as the ordinance in question 
prohibits any person to engage in the business of the 
sale of light beer AT RETAIL on Sunday in Orem City 
but permits others to sell light beer AT WHOLESALE 
on Sunday in Orem City. 
The sale of beer is by the Utah legislature, subject 
to the provisions of the Liquor Control Act, made fawful 
and legal. The sale of beer under the provisions of the 
Liquor Control Act is made a "respectable business." 
Certainly the courts of the state of Utah and the lesser 
political bodies of the .state have no power or authority 
to upset the mandate of the Utah Legislature. Whatever 
concepts of right and wrong were used in determining 
that beer could be sold legally within the state of Utah, 
it is the Utah Legislature which makes such determina-
tion. 
To single out a legal and respectable business and 
say willy nilly that it shall not be allowed to operate on 
Sunday is arbitrary and discriminatory and therefore 
unconstitutional and void. (EDEN v. PEOPLE (Ill.) 
161 Ill. 296, 43 N.E. 1109; CITY OF TACOMA v. 
KRECH (Wash) 15 Wash, 296, 46 P. 255; EX PARTE 
JENTZSCH (Cal) 112 Cal. 468, 44 P. 8023; SALT 
LAKE CITY v. REVENE, 101 Utah 504, 124 P. 2d 
537) 
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This court stated in GROl!·lLUXD l'. SALT LAKE 
CITY, 19-! P. 2d -!6-t, at page 468: 
'"Even bearing in n1ind the rule that the 
clas.sification upon whirh a Sunday closing law 
is based is ·within the discretion of the legislative 
branch and hence will be upheld unless clearly 
arbitrary, it is difficult to conceive of a fair rea-
son for some of the items excepted. It is readily 
apparent that some of the execptions are clearly 
based on necessity. But as to others, even con-
sidering the desirability of promoting recrea-
tional activity on Sunday, no fair reason suggests 
itself as to why their sale .should be permitted 
on Sunday while the sale of other commodities is 
prohibited. Neither sporting equipment nor nur-
sery products are such from the standpoint of the 
buyer or seller that they cannot be purchased on 
a week day, though it is the intention of the buyer 
to use the equipment and plant the tree or flowers 
on Sunday. Neither is it likely to deteriorate over 
Saturday night or be depleted during Sunday. 
Boxing gloves and baseball bats are at least as 
stable as butter and bananas. The same may be 
said of dentifrices and toiletries, tobacco and 
beer. The classification being on a commodity 
basis, it is arbitrary to permit the sale of a can 
of beer on Sunday and prohibit the sale of a can 
of orange juice or a can of coffee.'' 
In conformity with the above quotation, but con-
versely, it is logical to say, ''it is arbitrary to permit the 
sale of a ca.n of orange juice or a can of coffee on Sun-
day and prohibit the sale of a cam of beer." 
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CONCLUSION 
By reason of the fact that the ordinance in question 
is not designed to accomplish the purposes of a Sunday 
closing law and is thus an illegal and unjustified extension 
of the powers granted to municipal corporations by the 
statutes of this state, and the fact that the court in mak-
ing its decision read into the case evidence which was not 
agreed to by the parties or adduced at the trial, and in-
asmuch as the ordinance is violative of provisions of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah and of the Constitution 
of the United States as hereinabove set forth, it is re-
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of coun.sel 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
